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Introduction
This paper aims to offer a fresh perspective into what is at stake in the cross-cultural trade dispute over
genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) by subjecting a particular discursive sample, the parties’
submissions to the WTO panel, to critical scrutiny. The first step involves a survey of the rhetorical
strategies deployed by the parties’ in the presentation of their arguments to the Panel. Next, I embark on
the task of ‘disassembling the double helix’. My use of the term ‘double helix’ in this analysis refers to
the close coupling of scientific and legal discourses in the trade regime: science and law are two parallel
strands of discourse wound around each other, each punctuated at intervals by key binding sites where
linkages between the strands are anchored. The image I aim to conjure up is, of course, the one made
famous by Watson & Crick’s 1953 discovery of the structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), “the
molecule that genes are made of”. 1 A discovery which has led, inevitably, to the advances in molecular
biology that give rise to the technologies so contested in their current application to the task of
‘improving’ food. This work attempts to unfurl that twisted ladder and peel apart the strands of scientific
and legal discourse that are coiled together in the ‘double helix’ of international trade law dealing with
environmental and health risks. The aim is to gain some clarity from the disentanglement: it is hoped that
teasing the scientific from the legal discourses will expose the implicit assumptions at play when
international trade tribunals turn to scientific assessment as the means of separating the legitimate from
the protectionist in disputes over contested technologies.

The conflict under the rhetorical microscope in this study is the most recent, and controversial,
transnational ‘food fight’ between the United States (U.S.), Canada, and Argentina, on one hand, and the
European Communities (EC), on the other. 2 Certain aspects of the European scheme for regulating

* Inspiration for this title was drawn from Goodman, Heath and Lindee, for whom “nature/culture” is the
“labyrinthine intermingling of realms that calls into question both categories”, infra note 46 at 5.
1

This phrase appears in the First Submission of the United States at para.13, infra note 66.

2

The high profile ‘Beef Hormones’ dispute, which began formally before the WTO in the late 1990s and continues
to simmer, was the first of these transnational food fights. It pitted the U.S. and Canada against the EC in a similar
battle that, at its core, involved common questions of technology use in agriculture, confidence in regulatory
science, and the legitimacy of the WTO to impinge on national sovereignty in situations where regulations are

2

GMOs, both as crops and in foods, in the minds of the complainants on the other side of the Atlantic,
constitute unjustifiable barriers to trade. A three-person panel of trade law experts has been appointed by
the WTO to adjudicate the complaints (“the Panel”).3

By engaging in this very close reading of the parties’ submissions to the Panel, my gaze is focused on the
strategies by which those submissions are constructed so as to produce descriptions or accounts that will
be treated as “factual” by the Panel. How are claims made to appear neutral and stable, independent and
separate from the parties’ interests? How are conclusions made to appear necessary or logical? How are
particular arguments sustained with respect to both the necessary scientific ‘facts’ and the legal tests? In
particular, I explore the extent to which the parties mobilize systems of oppositions in their rhetorical
battle to convince the Panel that their interpretation of how law should handle trade in GMOs is the
correct interpretation.

“Scientific disputes”, it has been shown, “are not resolved simply by reference to scientific ‘facts’, but by
the adoption of rhetorical strategies that weave together ideological elements in a manner designed to
shape public discourse and gain legitimation”. 4 A key strategy for the parties is that of ‘categorizing the
claims-maker’. The status of knowledge claims about GMOs is tied closely to the authority or credibility
that can be assigned to the actor forwarding the claim. 5 Thus careful attention is paid to the parties’ choice

based less on science than on public perceptions, but where a protectionist motive is not proven (European
Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R, AB-2000-11 (2001). See Joanne Scott, “On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and
Environment in the EU and WTO”, in J.H.H. Weiler (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and NAFTA: Towards a Common
Law of International Trade? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 125.
3

European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO Doc DS291,
DS292, DS293 (2004) (“Biotech Products”). The parties filed their submissions in May 2004, and the first oral
hearing was held in June of that year. The Panel initially estimated that it would issue its final report to the parties by
the end of September 2004. Subsequent delay was said to be “due to the parties' common request for additional time
to prepare their rebuttals as well as the Panel's decision to seek scientific and technical expert advice pursuant to
Article 11 of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Article 13 of the DSU” (Communication
from the Chairman of the Panel, 18 August 2004). The Chairman of the Panel released a communication on June
15, 2005 indicating that the Panel had again encountered some delays due to the fact that new issues had been raised
by the parties, the matter is “particularly intricate” and the “experts process” had generated “vast amounts” of
material to be reviewed. The Panel stated its intention to issue its report by the end of October 2005
(Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, 15 June 2005). Another recent communication, however, now
predicts that the Panel’s report will not be released until January 2006. Of course, the Panel decision is also likely to
be followed by an appeal on points of law to the Appellate Body of the WTO.

4

Patrick O’Mahony & Tracey Skillington, “Constructing Difference: Discourse Coalitions on Biotechnology in the
Press” in Patrick O’Mahony (ed.) Nature, Risk and Responsibility: Discourses of Biotechnology (New York:
Routledge, 1999) 100 at 100.
5

For interesting work on the credibility of actors forwarding scientific claims in the context of politically-charged
policy, see Steven Epstein, Impure Science; AIDS, activism, and the politics of knowledge (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996).

3

of sources when they are making scientific knowledge claims. The stakes are high in this struggle, of
course, because the trade tribunal is a context in which “categorization is consequential”.6
The “nomenclature” 7 of transnational trade conflicts over environmental and health protection measures
now inevitably includes within its set of specialized terms and symbols “risk”, “uncertainty” and
“precaution”. In fact, I argue in this work that these concepts have become key binding sites for the
channels of communication that flow between the strands of discourse, scientific and legal, that constitute
the double helix of international trade law. Deconstruction of the parties’ submissions also reveals
competing conceptions of nature and competing roles for culture in the regime of liberalized trade. This
paper concludes by exploring some of the “rhetorical-ideological tasks” that nature is called upon to
perform. 8 I conclude that, while we are becoming familiar with the WTO as a place where “rival
renderings of nature” are forced to “confront each other … packaged in the idioms of legal discourse” 9,
the GMO dispute raises original and important questions about the role for culture in the science-based
trade disciplines of the WTO.
Methodology 10
Science and law treated as parallel authoritative discourses defined in terms of the techniques they
employ in the pursuit of truth. 11 Accordingly, I employ discourse analysis: critical study of the details of
language and of processes of rationalization and justification. 12 The aim is to reveal the “preconstructions,

6

Jonathan Potter, Representing Reality (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996).

7

J.H.H. Weiler, “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External
Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement." Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 9/00, Cambridge, MA (2001).
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/000901.html.

8

David Delaney, Law & Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 78.

9

Ibid. at 95.

10

I would like to acknowledge Yair Sagy, whose presentation on the methodology of structuralist and poststructuralist strategies of discourse analysis in the JSD Forum at the NYU School of Law was important to the
development of my thinking on this project. A discursive analysis of law, as Sagy emphasized, is necessarily only a
partial analysis. Thus, what I mean to provide with this work is simply an alternative lens for thinking about the
issues, including the legal issues, raised by this case.
11

My perspective has been informed by the work of my dissertation supervisor, Liora Salter, Mandated Science:
Science and Scientists in the Making of Standards (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988) as well as the
work of Brian Wynne, "Uncertainty and Environmental Learning - Reconceiving Science and Policy in the
Preventive Paradigm" (1992) 2 Global Environmental Change-Human and Policy Dimensions 111 and "Uncertainty
- Technical and Social" in H. Brooks & C. L. Cooper, ed., Science for Public Policy (Oxford: Pergamon Press,
1987) 95; and Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989) and "Citizens at Risk: Cultures of Modernity in the U.S. and EU" (2002) 11 Science as
Culture 363.
12

In applying this method to legal discourse, I am aware that I necessarily oppose the dominant view of legal
language. This view, as described by Peter Goodrich, sees legal language as “a discrete and unitary genre of written

4

preferred meanings, rhetorical and ideological dimensions” of both the ‘scientific’ and the ‘legal’ within
the institution of global trade. 13

I adopt a somewhat flexible approach to discourse analysis,

simultaneously deconstructing both the semantics of the text and the discursive strategies of the actors. 14
The broad theoretical framework of discourse analysis focuses attention on the constructive and
functional dimensions of discourse, and relies on the analysts’ eye for “patterns of consistency and
variation". 15 Specifically, what I look for is variability and consistency in what is said (and perhaps what
is not said), and the appearance of any 'repertoires' or 'narratives' that may betray important themes.
I work from a large but limited sample of data.16 Legal discourse, particularly in the form of pleadings to
a dispute settlement body, falls somewhere between ‘naturally-occurring’ talk and interview data. The
discursive sample, here, is not ‘forced’ in the sense that interviewees are directed in particular directions
by the analyst, but it is not free-flowing either, because it is necessarily constrained by the nature of the
proceeding it aims to influence. Importantly, however, except for its purposeful embedding of scientific
discourse within the legal argument 17, it is not constrained with respect to the practices I read it to
observe: that is, in terms of its use of the concepts of ‘risk’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘precaution’ or its
deployment of ‘nature’ as a rhetorical tool. Thus the discourse is not self-conscious in the sense that it
would be if the parties were interviewed for that particular purpose.

authorities constituting a grammar or code, which, if correctly attributed and interpreted, forms a series of necessary
truths” (at 205). The alternative, which approaches legal discourse as necessarily oppositional and contingent, seeks
to uncover the social and political commitments which legal discourse systematically seeks to deny and obscure (at
206). Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis (New York: St. Martins
Press, 1987).
13

Ibid. at 204.

14

This approach is adopted by T.A. van Dijk (ed.) Discourse and Communication: New Approaches to the Analysis
of Mass Media Discourse and Communication (Berlin: de Gryter, 1985).
15

Jonathan Potter & Margaret Wetherell, Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and behaviour
(London: Sage, 1987) at 169.
16

Both Canada’s and the EC’s First Written Submissions are over 200 pages long. The U.S. First Submission is 64
pages. I also examined Canada’s Reply Submission, and three Amicus Briefs around 30 pages each. The
submissions of Argentina have not been made officially publicly available and numerous efforts on my part to
obtain them from Embassy sources and trade representatives were unsuccessful. “Courtesy translations” of
Argentina’s submissions are available online, however, on the website of one of the amicus groups, Genewatch UK,
and these have been examined as well. Genewatch UK, “WTO Submissions”, online:
<http://www.genewatch.org/WTO/WTO_Submissions.htm>.
17

As will be explored in more detail in Parts III and IV, the very structure of the WTO agreements, particularly the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, when combined with the recent jurisprudence, imposes constraints on the
submissions of the parties, in particular it creates an incentive for the complainants to embed scientific justifications
into their arguments.

5

Nevertheless, what I enter is a unique discursive arena. 18 I focus initially on the arguments as presented
by the parties, drawing exclusively on their own submissions to the Panel. Eventually, in order to
examine the broader themes and issues raised by this dispute, I draw in the submissions of the amicae.
Like all persuasive texts, these submissions apply familiar rhetorical techniques: they try to anticipate
their opponents objections and “demolish them in advance”; they frame problems in particular ways
“intended to direct the reader down specific logical channels, while blocking off others”; they present
evidence with careful attention to the categorization of its sources; and they deftly manage ‘dilemmas of
stake’ (maneuvering through the webs of interests at play). 19

In its most general sense, discourse is the process in which knowledge is constituted through
communication. 20

Here, however, the term is employed in a more specific sense.

When making

reference to a “discourse”, I am speaking about a “particular mode of communication; a field
characterized by its own linguistic conventions, which both draws on and generates a distinctive way of
understanding the world”. 21 Thus, in this sense, scientific discourse differs from legal discourse in
interesting and illuminating ways. Each realm of knowledge is based on specific types of observations
and subject to particular forms of testing which are reflected in the discourse and in the parties’ reasons
for deploying one type over the other. In this context, a reliance on scientific or legal discourse in
particular instances is deliberate: “[e]ach discourse allows certain things to be said, thought, and done and
impedes or prevents other things from being said, thought, and done”. 22 The way that science and law
“clash, compete and collide”

23

in this case is consequential: “[d]iscourses have real effects; they are not

just the way that social issues get talked and thought about”. 24 They affect the way issues are decided.

18

I am not aware of any other study that has undertaken a discourse analysis of submissions to a trade tribunal. I
did, however, draw some inspiration from David Mercer’s 2002 study of the submissions to a public inquiry on the
health impacts of exposure to electromagnetic fields in Australia: David Mercer, “Scientific Method Discourses in
the Construction of ‘EMF’ Science: Interests, Resources and Rhetoric in Submissions to a Public Inquiry” (2002) 32
Social Studies of Science 205.
19

Steven Hilgartner, Science on Stage: Expert Advice as Public Drama (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2000) at 9.

20

Norman Fairclough, Discourse and social change (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992).

21

Kay Milton, Environmentalism and cultural theory: exploring the role of anthropology in environmental
discourse (New York; Routledge, 1996) at 167.
22

Alan Hunt & Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (London: Pluto
Press, 1994) at 8.
23

Ibid. at 9.

24

Ibid. at 8.

6

And the way in which this dispute is decided is a matter of global public interest. That this case is
‘watched’, and its resolution highly anticipated, is evidenced by the fact that fifteen nations have
registered their interest as third parties, 25 several amicus briefs have been filed, 26 intense academic
attention is devoted to its study, and an unprecedented level of public transparency surrounds the parties’
submissions.

27

According to Jacqueline Peel et al., at stake is “not only the multi-billion dollar

agricultural gene technology industry, but also (depending on who you listen to) the viability of organic
farming practices, future food security in developing countries, agricultural sustainability, global
biodiversity, long-term human health, and national regulatory autonomy regarding health and
environmental concerns”. 28 Finally, the legitimacy of the WTO itself is said to be on the line. For
example, several academics who submitted an amicus brief emphasize that the very legitimacy of the
WTO is threatened precisely because the case is seen as a test of whether the supranational institution is
flexible enough to accommodate national particularities, or differences in regulatory styles and in risk
tolerances, essentially, in the contextual contingencies of culture and place. 29

This paper consists of three parts. I begin with a brief introduction to the dispute and how it came to be
heard before the WTO. Next, in my exploration of the rhetoric of pleadings, I deconstruct the parties’
submissions to the Panel beginning with the complainants and then turning to the EC’s defence. In the
third part, I attempt to disassemble the ‘double helix’ of scientific and legal discourses, unfurling the tight
coil wound up by the recent WTO jurisprudence in the science-based trade disciplines. In this section, I

25

Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, New Zealand,
Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand and Uruguay have registered their interest in the disputes as third parties affected
by the outcome.
26

The WTO dispute settlement bodies have the discretion to accept and consider unsolicited amicus curiae briefs
(United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/R (1998)
(Report of the Appellate Body). At least three “non-state actors” have filed amicus briefs before the WTO: a global
coalition of 15 public interest groups with representation from all parties (WTO Doc WT/DS291, WT/DS292,
WT/DS293 (2004) (Public Interest Amicus); a group of five ‘environmental’ organizations, including the Center for
International Environmental Law (CIEL), Friends of the Earth – United States (FOE), Defenders of Wildlife,
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, and the Organic Consumers Association – United States) (WTO Doc
WT/DS291, WT/DS292, WT/DS293 (2004) (Environmentalist Amicus); and a group of five ‘expert academics’
from both the UK and the U.S. (Lawrence Busch, Robin Grove-White, Sheila Jasanoff, David Winickoff and Brian
Wynne),(WTO Doc WT/DS291, WT/DS292, WT/DS293 (2004) (Academic Amicus).
27

Jacqueline Peel, Rebecca Nelson, and Lee Godden, “GMO Trade Wars: The Submissions in the U.S.-EC Biotech
Dispute in the WTO”, Draft Working Paper presented in the NYU Colloquium Globalization and its Discontents,
March 30, 2005 (noting that in the “short history of dispute settlement in the WTO, few cases have excited as much
anxious anticipation”.) Peel et al also argue that the “intense public interest” in the dispute is responsible for the
“unprecedented level of transparency regarding their arguments and submissions to the WTO” (at 2-3).
Nevertheless, as mentioned, the submissions of Argentina still have not been made publicly available.
28

Peel et al, ibid. at 2.

29

Academic Amicus Brief, supra note 26.
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explore the concepts of “risk”, “uncertainty” and “precaution” that increasingly characterize and polarize
risk controversies in the transnational realm.

PART 1:

A Brief Introduction to the Case

Developments in the early nineties betrayed no signs of the ferocious food fight that would eventually
unfold. Innovation in biotechnology was proceeding in Europe according to largely the same principles
as it was in Canada and the U.S.. Between 1991 and 1998, for example, the EC approved the marketing
of 18 GMOs. 30 In this ‘first generation’ of regulation, the EC aimed for a “high level” of protection with
respect to health and the environment, but it followed the case-by-case style of assessment that was the
backbone of the regulatory regimes in the big GM producing nations. 31 Beginning in October 1998,
however, with 12 applications pending, the EC stopped issuing approvals. On top of this, some EC
member states invoked a safeguard clause to temporarily ban certain GM food products from their
markets.
The EC argues that increasing scientific concern regarding the risks of GMOs gave rise to growing
consumer unease and international regulatory developments such as the conclusion of the Cartagena
Protocol. In response to these pressures, the EC states that it undertook to review its legislation on
GMOs between 1998 and 2001. A new “farm-to-fork” regulatory framework was put in place in 2001
and became operational at the end of 2002. 32 The “moratorium” was formally lifted in October 2002 with
a new directive designed to update and strengthen the process for assessing whether a GMO posed a risk
to human health. The EC also is currently in the process of implementing extensive legislation dealing
with the marketing and sale of GM foods, including traceability and labeling requirements. 33 As for the
bans, the EU member states imposing them have stated that they will remain in place until the new
labelling and traceability rules are in effect.
30

EC Submission, infra note 92 at para.155.

31

Council Directive 90/220/EEC adopted in April 1990 governed the deliberate release of GMOs into the
environment and regulated their placement onto the market (hereinafter “Directive 90/220”). In 1997, the EC added
another layer, Council Regulation 258/97 which served to streamline the approval of ‘novel foods’ that could be
judged “substantially equivalent” to conventional foods. The concept of substantial equivalence is central to the
regulation of GMOs in the complaining party states.
32

Council Directive 2001/18/EC repealed the earlier Directive and instituted a more detailed set of principles to
guide environmental risk assessment, as well as provisions for post-marketing surveillance.

33

To avoid the 'contamination' of non-GM food with GMOs, the EU sets a 1% minimum threshold for unintended
GM content, above which labeling is mandatory. The proposed new labeling rules would lower this threshold to
0.9% for approved GMOs and set a threshold of 0.5% for unapproved GMOs. In order to enforce the labeling
requirements, the EC also adopted procedures for the traceability of GMOs. These “farm-to-fork” proposals require
all handlers of food throughout the production-to-market chain to document the source of GMOs.

8

Not surprisingly, the ‘Big Three’ GM food-producing countries have criticized the EC's “precautionary
approach”. The complainants, U.S., Argentina, and Canada, account for about 99% of the total world
production of GM foods. 34 Thus, these countries have a significant commercial incentive to promote the
acceptance of GM foods and to oppose any regulations they perceive as barriers to trade. U.S. GM food
producers have blasted the latest EC proposals, insisting they are “confusing, misleading, unnecessary,
unenforceable, discriminatory, and open to fraud” - in other words, a cover for trade protectionism. 35
Faced with intense pressure from their domestic farm lobbies, the complainants requested the initiation of
dispute settlement proceedings against the EC in the WTO in 2003.36
The U.S. case rests largely on its characterization of the EC regulatory scheme as “phytosanitary
measures”. The Agreement on Sanitary and Phyotosanitary Measures (“the SPS Agreement”) is an
agreement of the WTO which covers trade-restrictive measures put in place by Members to protect
against risks to human, plant or animal life or health.37 Canada, however, also makes arguments under
other WTO agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) and the
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (the “TBT Agreement). The EC resists the argument that its
regime can be judged strictly in light of international trade agreements alone.

PART II:

The Rhetoric of Pleading

THE COMPLAINT
First Written Submission of Canada

34

Peter W. B. Phillips & W. A. Kerr, “Alternative Paradigms: The WTO versus the Biosafety Protocol for Trade in
Genetically Modified Organisms” (2000) 34 Journal of World Trade 63. GM food sales are forecast to reach U.S.$8
billion by 2005 and U.S.$25 billion by 2010.
35

G. Yerkey, “U.S. Looking to Ask EU for Talks in WTO over Ban on Imports of GMO Food Products'”, WTO
Reporter (22 October 2002).
36

Request for Consultations by the United States, Biotech Products, WT/DS291/1, 20 May 2003; Request for
Consultations by Canada, Biotech Products, WT/DS292/1, 20 May 2003; Request for Consultations by Argentina,
Biotech Products, WT/DS293/1, 21 May 2003. When these consultations failed to resolve the dispute, the U.S.
requested the establishment of a panel, Biotech Products, WTO Doc WT/DS291/23 (2003). See also Gregory C.
Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, “Regulating Between National Fears and Global Disciplines: Agricultural
Biotechnology in the EU” (2004) Jean Monnet Working Paper Series edited by J.H.H. Weiler, New York University
School of Law at 27 (for the argument that the farm and biotech lobbies pressured the U.S. to bring the challenge).
37

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, April 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
1A, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm [SPS Agreement].

9

In its First Written Submission to the WTO Panel, Canada takes the following basic position: since there
is nothing inherently risky about transgenic organisms, each new product should be assessed on a caseby-case basis. The submission stresses that the EC suspension of the approval process, the “de facto
moratorium”, is a failure to assess the risks of products to health and the environment on a case-by-case
basis, and thus is a violation of international trade rules. Canada makes five key discursive moves.

First, the Canadian submission works immediately to erect boundaries around the legitimate issues for
debate. Wasting no time, in paragraph 2 of 508 paragraphs, Canada brings the focus directly onto the
“assessment of risks to human health and the environment”. 38 This is a strategy of containment. In
framing the problem in these terms, certain questions are bracketed off. Canada’s narrative goes like this:
‘biotech products’ must be approved to be marketed in the EC, the approval process involves the
assessment of risks to health and the environment (and, by implication, only risks to health and the
environment). Therefore, this dispute is about the EC’s failure to assess risks to human health and the
environment. In taking this tack, Canada is already constructing a boundary around the dispute – it is
saying “this case is about safety”. Not culture, not ethics, not morality, and definitely not sovereignty.

Second, Canada stresses the importance of putting “modern biotechnology in its historical and scientific
context”. 39 In its first substantive section of argument, Canada puts a premium on context; however, as I
will uncover, it is only a specific type of context that favours Canada’s position. Canada seeks to focus
the discussion on the comparison between two types of risk: those presented by modern biotechnology
and those presented by conventional plant breeding techniques. 40

Canada is not making a claim of safety with respect to its ‘biotech products’, it is simply emphasizing that
conventional breeding techniques are similarly risky. For example, it points to an OECD task force which
concludes that the potential risks associated with foods derived from biotechnology “are not inherently
different from the risks associated with conventional foods”. 41 Next, it refers to a joint FAO/WHO expert

38

First Written Submission of Canada, Biotech Products, DS192, April 21, 2004.

39

Ibid. at para.9. In Canada’s submission, “the terms “modern biotechnology” and “transgenics” refer to
recombinant DNA techniques”, otherwise known as genetic modification.
40

The comparison strategy is important because the issue of baseline is recurring and contested: what will the risks
of GMOs be judged relative to? Canada tells the Panel to bear in mind that modern agriculture does not occur in a
natural environment, but in a “highly controlled system”. Similarly, Canada wants the panel to judge the risks of
adverse effects on non-target species presented by plants genetically-modified with insect tolerance “in relation to
those of the conventional insecticides that these crops are intended to replace”. It is a reminder to the Panel:
intensive agriculture is not on trial. It is not GM crops versus the unadulterated English countryside, it is the risks of
GMOs relative to the risks of conventional crops grown by industrial agriculture that you must keep in mind.
41

Supra note 38 at para.11.

10

consultation report in 1996 that characterizes the two types of risk as “of the same nature”. 42 This
strategy is an example of what Les Levidow & Susan Carr have called “normalizing novelty”. 43 The task
is to transform ‘the novel’ into ‘the routine’. As the storyline goes, risk is an inevitable part of life and of
progress.

Relatively speaking, the risks associated with ‘modern biotechnology’ are minimal and

manageable.

Canada’s submission continues, for example, to list the risks associated with “genetic modification,
whether by transgenic or conventional means”. 44 The message is that these risks are not new; they are
ordinary, they are routine. Canada seeks to explain to the Panel members that these risks are simply partand-parcel of what we deal with in the day-to-day of providing food for your table. The line of argument
emphasizes that the “supposed risks of transgenesis are rarely compared with the ‘ordinary’ risks
stemming from modern agriculture”. 45 Thus, Canada works to place the focus on the historical context of
technological advances in agriculture, even while it works to exclude the social context of regulating
GMOs in Europe.

Third, presumably in anticipation of its opponent’s rhetoric, Canada spins the “controlling nature”
argument on its head. Canada knows the critique of biotechnology that is gaining purchase with the
transnational anti-globalization movement. 46 These activists “often appeal to a type of genetic naturalism
that condemns human beings for disrupting a static, pristine nature”.47 The “Frankenfoods” mantra feeds
on the image of bad things happening when you “mess with Mother Nature”. 48 Thus, Canada’s next

42

Ibid.

43

Les Levidow & Susan Carr, “Normalizing Novelty: Regulating Biotechnological Risk at the U.S. EPA”, (2000)
11 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 9.
44

Supra note 38 at para.12.

45

Canada quotes the Commission Directorate General for Research, ibid., at para.16

46

For a rich description of the diverse global movement against biotechnology, see Chaia Heller & Arturo Escobar,
“From Pure Genes to GMOs: Transnationalized Gene Landscapes in the Biodiversity and Transgenic Food
Networks” in Goodman, Heath & Lindee (eds.) Genetic Nature/Culture: Anthropology and Science Beyond the
Two-Culture Divide (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003) 155. The movement is made
up of peasant farmers, indigenous peoples, consumers and ecology groups “[d]rawing linkages between food, land,
bodily sovereignty, cultural autonomy, and identity” in protest against the “biological and cultural homogenization”
associated with GMOs and fast-food.
47

Heller & Escobar , ibid., at 157.

48

‘Messing with Mother Nature”, An Interview with David Suzuki, online: http://www.newtimes.org
/issue/0305/suzuki.htm.
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maneuver is an example of what is often called “offensive rhetoric”. 49 It appropriates the narrative of
controlling nature with the sole intention of undermining the anticipated opposing description. 50

Canada explains that both conventional breeding and transgenic techniques can result in “unintended
effects”. 51 It states that “[i]n achieving the objective of conferring a specific target trait (intended effect)
to the host organism by insertion of defined DNA sequences, additional traits could, theoretically, be
acquired or existing traits lost (unintended effects).” 52

Canada calls this “an inherent and general

phenomenon”. But the next move takes it one further:

One of the advantages of transgenic techniques is the ability to limit genetic changes in the
resulting plant and, therefore, reduce the likelihood of unintended consequence. Because
transgenic modification permits scientists to transfer selected genes with well-known traits, there
is theoretically less risk that the resulting organism will exhibit unintended or undesirable traits. 53
The idea here is that “controlling nature” is actually a good thing. It will render (re)production more
productive. It will bring predictability to (re)production. Thus, the use of transgenic techniques is
portrayed as a simple improvement on conventional techniques.

“Gene talk” is becoming ubiquitous in modern society. It reflects an increasing willingness to turn to
‘genes’, the “building blocks of life”, for answers to medical, agricultural, environmental and social
problems. 54 This discourse seeks to recast biology in engineering terms. 55 There is talk of enhanced
traits in organisms and their progeny that come about through modifications to their genetic blueprints. 56
The result is a tamed, docile and productive nature. It is feat of engineering, analogous to rendering a
raging river into a quiet canal. An example of this strategy is also found in the U.S. submission:
Modern biotechnology continues the trend in developing ever more precise and effective methods
for improving the productivity and functionality of plants, animals and microorganisms. Over the
49
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centuries, plants have been genetically engineered through, among other methods, selective
breeding, grafting, crossbreeding, induced mutation, and tissue culture. Modern biotechnology, or
recombinant DNA technology, is the latest technique in genetic modification to have been
developed and applied to crop plants. 57
That an object is ‘knowable’, in this narrative, means that the object is manipulable. 58 Thus, controlling
nature becomes “improving nature”, and Frankenfoods become “functional foods”.

Fourth, a key move made by Canada is in its strategic choice of scientific sources. Canada knows that the
best way to avoid the insinuation that ‘their science’ reflects ‘their interests’ is to deploy their opponents’
science. Reliance on EC sources is a move in the “stakes” game. It is a strategy that exclaims: “it’s not
just us saying this – it’s their own scientists too”. 59

In ‘categorizing the claims-maker’, Canada is attempting to transform the ‘speaker’ from an interested
Canadian making arguments, to a disinterested scientist describing reality. The categorization “has the
effect of re-situating (or re-contextualizing) the [claims] by tying them to the circumstances of their
production”. 60 The disinterested scientist tests knowledge through the systematic application of scientific
methods – repetition, validation, replication. Assignment of membership to the category of disinterested
scientists thus serves to upgrade the credibility and persuasiveness of the speakers’ statements. 61 For
example, Canada relies on a quote by the EC’s “own” Health and Consumer Protection DirectorateGeneral which recognizes that “breeding techniques in general produce genetic changes in plants”.
Canada goes on to submit that “the Commission has stated that its own research has confirmed that
GMOs so far developed and marketed in the EC, following the usual risk assessment procedures, have not
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shown any new risks to human health or the environment, beyond the usual uncertainties of conventional
plant breeding…”. 62

Finally, as mentioned, Canada calls for “case-by-case analysis”. Canada points out that the EC (“itself”)
has recognized that “like all organisms, GMOs are neither inherently risky nor safe.” 63 The degree of risk
or safety, Canada submits, depends on the characteristics of the inserted gene(s), the final organism that is
produced, the environment in which the plant is released and the application to which the plant is put. 64
Thus, Canada states that “there is general agreement amongst international experts that risk assessments
for biotech products should be carried out on a case-by-case basis”. 65

Scientific assessment of new crops or foods on a case-by-case basis favours the interests of biotechnology
developers, and the complainants, because it denies the consideration of broader questions, such as “is
this a technology we want to invest in?” or “is this the direction we want agricultural production to take in
our country”? Case-by-case approvals of technological applications is an incrementalist approach that
essentially removes the power to influence the direction of policy development from the political
community.

First Submission of the U.S.

In its First Written Submission, the U.S. takes the basic position that the EC measures are not based on
“sound science”, and as such, they represent violations of the EC’s commitments under the WTO,
particularly with respect to the SPS Agreement. The U.S. also makes a case that the EC’s failure to
implement its own regulatory review process constitutes “undue delay”. The U.S. strategy consists of six
critical discursive moves.

First, the U.S. immediately moves to bring the consumer into the picture. It reminds the Panel that
consumers have been and are currently “enjoying the benefits” of biotechnology with no adverse effect.

The EC has adopted approval procedures for agricultural products produced with the benefit of
modern biotechnology. Up to October 1998, the EC implemented those procedures, and approved
62
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more than ten biotech products. Consumers in the EC have been enjoying the benefits of these
products, without any adverse health or environmental effects.66
Not only does this constitute a reifying strategy for the U.S. - turning the abstract talk of safety,
productivity and nature into a material thing (food) which is being eaten and enjoyed by Europeans and
Americans alike, 67 it also is deploying a powerful norm of international trade law.
The objective of increasing consumer choice is central to liberal trade theory. 68 A greater choice in
consumer goods is understood to increase the welfare of consumers. 69 This same strategy of invoking a
norm that will be very familiar to the Panel is repeated in the next U.S. maneuver.

Second, the U.S. submission sets out to make the Panel feel comfortable, competent, at ease. The U.S.
argues that the critical issue to be decided in this case is one that falls directly into an area of the Panel’s
core competence. For example, the U.S. emphasizes problems with the regulatory process in the EC and
argues that the moratorium constitutes undue delay and is not transparent:

The U.S. submits that the EC’s adoption of the moratorium is inconsistent with the EC’s
obligations under the WTO Agreement, and in particular the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. While Members are allowed to maintain approval systems
– and the U.S. is not objecting to the EC maintaining such a system for biotech products – the
procedures under that system must be undertaken and completed “without undue delay.” It is hard
to think of a situation that involves “undue delay” more than a complete moratorium on
approvals….. In short, having established a biotech approval regime, the EC is obligated to apply
those procedures fairly and transparently, and without undue delay. 70
The objective of this narrative is to reassure the Panel that they are on familiar territory, they have
expertise in this area, and they can safely dispose of the case on this basis. Persuasion, as the best
litigants have learned, “is dependent upon both the presentation and the reception of messages”. 71
Here, the U.S. is speaking directly to its audience in language they will be able to receive.
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Another example in a similar vein, is the U.S. strategy of evoking economic analogy. In a return to the
narrative that emphasizes the advantages of genetic modification over more conventional breeding
techniques, the U.S. calls on language the Panel is likely to be very familiar with: the language of
economics.

Improved understanding of the biochemistry underlying the laws of genetics has allowed
scientists to operate on the molecular level and to develop new “transgenic” techniques – i.e.,
techniques in which a discrete number of genes (usually one or several) are transferred to an
organism. The major difference between the traditional forms of genetic modification described
above and recombinant DNA technology is not in the basic strategy but the much improved
efficiency and precision of the genetic transfer. In both cases, the goal is to improve a plant by
introducing a particular trait or set of traits through the transfer of genes. Recombinant DNA
technology permits scientists to accomplish this goal by transferring only those genes that are
needed, without transferring unnecessary and potentially problematic genes.72
The appeal to “improved efficiency” puts the opponents of biotechnology in the position of “luddites”
wanting to hold society back, stuck in the past using primitive inefficient methods. Embedding market
logic and economistic rationality in the narrative plays into the “dominant nature-exploiting cultural code
of modernity.” 73 The U.S. knows well that representations will be regarded as realistic to the extent that
they employ language “so familiar it operates transparently”.74

Third, in grounding its argument in the SPS Agreement, the U.S. relies on the ideological work done by
the call for “sound science”. 75 It states:

One of the most important concepts in the SPS Agreement is that any sanitary or phytosanitary
measure must have a basis in science. Article 2.2 of the Agreement explicitly obligates Members
to “ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is . . . based on scientific principles and is
not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.” This requirement was intended to allow
Members to protect against real concerns regarding food safety and human and animal health
while reducing potential abusive uses of SPS measures for protectionist rather than legitimate
purposes. 76
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The call for “sound science” is intended to suggest a proposition so reasonable that no one could object to
it – that reliable information and knowledge will produce better policy. The “sound science” principle,
however, conceals a very basic normative assumption: that society should proceed with any technological
advance possible unless ‘science’ tells us not to. The only real, valid or legitimate reason for opposing a
technology, according to this narrative, is a scientific reason.

Conflating technological advance with social progress is “so much an article of faith that public
opposition to technology seems scarcely comprehensible”. 77 Once the “sound science” dogma is adopted,
and “acceptance of a technological innovation is deemed natural and 'right', then caution and resistance
become the phenomena that demand special explanation”. 78 In this storyline, since ‘knowledgeable’
citizens would have “no good reason to hold out against new and beneficial technologies”, any resistance
must derive from ignorance, superstition or irrationality. The strategy of the U.S. here is to set up a
binary choice: the measure is either based on “sound science” or it is “disguised protectionism”.

Fourth, the U.S. ‘ups the ante’ by bringing in the potential benefits associated with the development of
these technologies.

The submission expresses the U.S. “confidence” that “once the EC allows its

scientific and regulatory procedures to reach their conclusion, it will once again approve new biotech
products, benefitting EC consumers and biotech producers around the world”. 79 This statement is
illuminating because it gives a clue to the U.S. conception of the “stakeholders” in this dispute: they are
EC consumers and biotechnology firms. And yet, in their rhetoric, the U.S. seems to be concerned about
a much wider group of stakeholders.

First, for example, they make reference to the therapeutic

applications of biotechnology for victims of disease:

In theory, any gene from any living organism can be transferred into another organism giving that
organism the ability to do something that it could not previously have done – e.g., resist a
particular disease or produce a vitamin it had not previously been able to produce. Some of the
early applications of this knowledge and of transgenic technology have been dramatic and
profound. For example, before the enhancement of this technology, humans suffering from
diabetes had to obtain insulin from the pancreases of pigs. Now, most insulin used in human
therapy for diabetes can be produced using human genes responsible for the production of
insulin. 80
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Next, they allude to the benefits of modern biotechnology for the environment, including higher
agricultural output and lower utilization of agricultural chemicals, fertilizers, and water in commercial
farming. 81 And finally, the U.S. raises the prospect that biotechnology will, on top of all these other
benefits, alleviate world hunger:

As Nobel Laureate Norman Bourlaug said, the requirement to double the current level of food
production by 2025 (to meet world food demand) “cannot be accomplished unless
farmers across
the world have access to current high-yielding crop production methods as
well
as
new
biotechnological breakthroughs that can increase the yields, dependability,
and nutritional quality
of our basic food crops. 82
In this narrative, the ‘benefits of biotechnology’ stands in for universal human progress.

Fifth, the U.S., in a defensive strategy, aims to demonstrate the proven safety record of GMOs. This is a
clear attempt to pre-empt the EC’s detailing of the questions surrounding safety and to take the sting out
of their critique. Where the EC will attempt to convey vast scientific uncertainties with respect to this
‘new’ technology, the U.S. works to construct experience, evidence and certainty.

The safety of biotech products has been confirmed by scientific reports issued under the auspices
of renowned international institutions, such as the FAO and WHO, seven national and
international academies of science, and the OECD, as well as independent scientists in the U.S.,
Africa and Europe…The scientific findings on the safety of biotech products are confirmed by
empirical evidence. For the past decade, farmers in various parts of the world have been sowing
and harvesting millions of acres of transgenic corn, soybeans, rapeseed, potatoes and cotton, all of
which are used, to greater or lesser degrees, in the production of food products or animal feed.
The multinational science academies report concluded that “[t]o date, over 30 million hectares of
transgenic crops have been grown and no human health problem associated specifically with the
ingestion of transgenic crops or their products have been identified.” Similarly, the French
National Academy of Science noted that transgenic crops are widely cultivated, and “there has
never been a health problem regarding consumers or damage to the environment.” Finally, a
report by the Royal Society of the United Kingdom stated, “[g]iven the very long history of DNA
consumption from a wide variety of sources, we conclude that such consumption poses no
significant risk to human health, and that additional ingestion of [genetically modified] DNA has
no effect. 83
An important part of this narrative is to counter the anticipated ‘novelty’ argument by leaving the Panel
with the impression that this technology is already so ubiquitous, that it is essentially futile to object to it.
The U.S. emphasizes that the technology is “now widely used to improve the functionality and yield of
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economically important plants around the world”. The submission describes several “cultivars of food
plants” that have been developed since the early 1990s, mentioning even the Flavr Savr tomato,
“modified to delay ripening and extend shelf life”, that was a complete commercial failure. The point,
however, according to the U.S. submission, is that “[b]y 2002, five and a half to six million farmers were
cultivating crops derived from recombinant DNA technology on 58.7 million hectares (145 million acres)
of land”. Since 1996, it emphasizes, “the global land area devoted to transgenic crops has grown thirtyfive-fold”, the crops are cultivated in sixteen countries, and fifty one percent of the world’s soybeans are
produced from transgenic seed.

Sixth, and finally, the U.S. caps their case with the provision of a ‘motive’. Demonstrating a protectionist
intent on the part of the nation erecting a trade barrier is an important rhetorical hurdle notwithstanding
the fact that the failure to do so is not a bar to success under the SPS Agreement. 84 The U.S. knows that,
at the end of the day, their task is to convince the Panel that this really is protectionism:

The EC has applied the general moratorium in a manner that results in “discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade”… In determining whether a measure has been applied
in a manner that results in “discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade,” the
Appellate Body has considered certain factors (e.g., “warning signals” and “additional
factors”)…The EC’s application of the general moratorium exhibits all three “warning signals”
and an “additional factor” which indicate that the measure discriminates or provides a disguised
restriction on international trade.
As to the evidence of a protectionist motive, or ‘warning signals’ of such an intent, the U.S. points to the
fact that the EC opts for different levels of protection from risks in “different yet comparable
situations”. 85 For example, they show that the EC regime tolerates products produced from GMO
processing aids (such as test-tube production of the enzyme chymosin used in the production of some
specialty cheeses, or GM yeasts used in the production of beer). The implication is that since these
products are not subject to the same regulations as GM foods and crops, the real intent behind the strict
regime must be the protection of EC farmers and not the protection of EC consumers or the environment.
In making the case for a “disproportionate effect” of the ‘moratorium’ on producers outside the EC as
compared to producers within the EC, the U.S. adopts a factual, descriptive tone:
In 2001, the EC accounted for less than four-tenths of one percent of the worldwide land area
devoted to growing biotech products. In contrast, the U.S., Argentina, Canada, and China
accounted for ninety-nine percent of the total land area devoted to biotech products in 2001. For
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producers in these countries, the moratorium on approvals of biotech products has had a
substantial negative effect. The disproportionate impact of the general moratorium on internal
versus imported products is an “additional factor” as it is a strong indication that the measure is
discriminatory or a disguised restriction on international trade.
But what the U.S. needs to watch out for here is the ‘dilemma of stake’. 86 This is the possibility that
anything a party says may be dismissed or discounted as an artifact of their stake or interest in the
outcome. Thus, “[m]anagement of stake is one of the central features in the production of factual
discourse”. 87 Implying a trade protectionist motive in this case is a double-edged strategy for the U.S. In
demonstrating a disproportionate impact on its own producers versus EC producers, it is also revealing
and foregrounding its own stake in characterizing the issues in the way it does. The description firmly
establishes the U.S. interest: they are heavily invested in this technology and their industry is wholeheartedly committed to it.88 Interest-invoking potentially carries a lot of sway but in this case it also may
work to undermine the fact-construction ability of the U.S.

THE DEFENCE

The tone of the EC defence is indignant. It characterizes its contested regime as the careful actions of a
prudent government in the face of uncertainties around a new technology. Furthermore, it expressly
argues that the WTO is not the right forum to decide a dispute of this nature. Even if the dispute is one
that can be decided under WTO law, the EC takes the position that the complainants have framed the
dispute too narrowly. For example, it argues that EC actions are entirely consistent with international
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standards, and in fact, its actions are best judged according to the most relevant international treaty, the
Cartagena Protocol. 89 The EC makes essentially five moves.

First Written Submission of the EC
The first discursive strategy of the EC is to “win back the words”.90 It intends to make it very clear to the
Panel: we are dealing with genetically modified organisms. Not ‘modern biotechnology’ or ‘biotech
products’ or ‘agricultural products produced with the benefit of modern biotechnology’. 91 In the request
for consultations, the U.S. framed their complaint as one pertaining to the EC “measures affecting the
marketing and approval of biotech products”, and this language has been adopted by all the official WTO
documents. The EC submissions resist this terminology, and speak repeatedly about ‘GMOs’, ‘GM
crops’ and ‘GM foods’.

This move disrupts the narratives introduced by the complainants by introducing competing descriptions.
A “genetically modified organism”, according to the EC, “is an organism in which the genetic material
has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination.”

92

The

unnaturalness of GMOs is a thread that runs through the EC narrative. For example, the EC continually
returns to the claim that “alteration to genetic material which leads to the production of a GMO usually
consists of the insertion of foreign genes into the cells of the receiving organism”. 93 The submission
repeats that it is “foreign” genes that are inserted during genetic modification… and that “[t]he difference
between genetic modification and conventional breeding practices is that the latter do not allow for the
crossing of natural species barriers, or for the transfer of single or few genes instead of whole
genomes.” 94

This narrative aims at transforming the normalized, the ordinary and the routine, into the foreign, the
unknown, the risky. GMOs are portrayed as unnatural because the genes are introduced from the
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‘outside”, not belonging, as in a ‘foreign object’. Dictionary references to the word foreign indicate that
related words include “obnoxious”, “repellant”, and “repugnant”. 95 Thus, the ‘unnatural’ is meant to
convey not only a sense of the unknown and the uncertain, but a sense of the unwanted, the unwelcome.

Invoking the natural/unnatural dichotomy is a telling strategy. The construction of binary oppositions is
intended “to place two things in hierarchy, to ensure that one is favoured over the other” . 96 The
opposition “works to undermine the credibility of one side and to support that of the other”. 97 Just as to
characterize something as ‘natural’ can be “a powerful way of legitimating it” 98, so the label ‘unnatural’
invites illegitimacy. Thus the EC’s definition of what constitutes a GMO, an organism whose cells have
undergone the insertion of foreign genes, while it is framed as cold hard description, leans towards
normative judgment in its choice of language.

Second, the EC, cultivating its image as the careful, prudent, responsible government, stresses the balance
and reasonableness of its approach. The EC states that it “has not adopted any general position either in
favour or against GMOs”. 99 Attempting to adopt an impartial, disinterested stance, the EC seeks to
discount the ‘stake’ that the U.S. submission carefully constructed in its arguments on disguised
protectionism. The EC states that it recognises the “very real potential benefits” of GMOs. It also
underlines that it “is equally conscious, however, that the technologies which produce GMOs are new and
their long-term consequences relatively unknown”.100

Thus the ‘novelty’ of GMOs which was so

carefully dismantled by the U.S., is systematically re-built.

Next, in line with this emphasis on the unknown, the EC sets out to document the uncertain and evolving
state of the science around GMOs. It argues that the matter is tremendously complex scientifically and
argues that the effects of GMOs and GM foods on health and the environment are only beginning to be
understood. 101 According to the EC, both the “underlying science and the evolution of acceptable
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regulatory solutions” remain “in a state of great flux”. 102 All over the world, the Panel is reminded,
GMOs “have been the subject of intense debate between governments and amongst members of the
public.” 103
GMO research and development is an ever evolving science. To begin with, the very process of
creating GMOs is still surrounded by uncertainties. Despite advances, it has already been
mentioned that the various techniques of inserting foreign DNA do not control where the
insertion takes place, the number of copies inserted or their level of expression, nor do they
guarantee that the foreign gene is stably integrated by the host genome.” 104…There remains
significant scientific uncertainty, and prudent governments have put in place and funded longterm farm-scale trials to assess these impacts before authorising commercial growing of GM
crops as well as requirements for continuous monitoring of the effects.” 105
The narrative of ‘prudence’ and ‘precaution’ is central to the EC defence. The EC returns repeatedly to
this storyline:
The EC actions in taking all necessary steps demanded by its citizens to protect against risks to
human health and the environment were prudent and they were reasonable. The EC did not go as
far as certain other states (or parts of states) which actually adopted outright bans (albeit
sometimes of a temporary nature) on trade in, and cultivation of, GMOs and/or GM products.” 106
…the approach of the EC to the identification, assessment and prevention of risks to human
health and the environment from each of these GMOs has been fully consistent with evolving and
applicable international standards, and any finding to the contrary would seriously undermine the
effectiveness of those standards, which are premised on the application of a prudent and
precautionary approach… 107
Discussion of the precautionary principle, and the centrality of “precaution” to the rhetoric of this dispute,
is explored in Part III of this paper.

Fourth, the EC counters the doctrine of ‘substantial equivalence’. The argument that GMOs are largely
equivalent to their conventional counterparts, a central element in the complainants’ cases, is outright
rejected by the EC.

In fact, the EC argues that the international community has clearly rejected

‘substantial equivalence’ as well. It states:
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…between 1996 and 2000 a specialised international convention – the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety (“Biosafety Protocol”) - was negotiated, which is premised on a clear understanding
that the inherent characteristics of GMOs require them to be subject to rigorous scrutiny so as to
ensure that they do not cause harm to the environment or human health, or cause socio-economic
disruptions. 108
Thus, the EC takes the very existence of the Cartagena Protocol to be evidence that the international
community has concluded that GMOs are not to be treated as being the same as their non-GMO,
conventional equivalents. Further, it stands for the proposition that special measures of protection, based
on the precautionary principle, are justified with respect to the regulation of GMOs. 109 In order to
legitimate their special regulatory treatment, the EC builds up a narrative that emphasizes the uniqueness
of GMOs. This narrative is based on the characterization of GMOs as living technologies, with the
capacity to reproduce, and self-replicate.

In the specific case of GMOs, regulators have to deal with new types of living organisms which
once released into the environment can self-replicate and spread without further human
intervention. Therefore, product withdrawal after environmental release becomes a lot more
complicated in the case of GMOs than in the case of products like chemicals. As a result, the
development of GMOs has been raising all new challenges for regulators. 110
Fifth and finally, the EC transforms the debate into an issue of sovereignty and invokes its right to set its
own “level of protection”. 111 From a rhetorical perspective, this is the EC’s most critical maneuver. The
EC begins this offensive by noting that it “has not sought to impose its approach” to GMOs on the
complainants. They are free, according to the EC, to “form their own view on the balance of benefits and
risks” associated with the technology. The EC continues:

Equally, however, it cannot be right that the Complainants should be allowed to impose their
approach on the EC, or indeed on any other countries, and to do so through the WTO. Even less
so at a time when countries around the world are still trying to clarify the balance between risks
and benefits.” 112
This is a direct challenge to the limits placed on the debate by Canada. Where the complainants toiled to
carefully empty the dispute of social context in favour of ‘historical and scientific context’, the EC now
seeks to reverse that process. The context that the EC wants to re-introduce is that of the political and
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social controversy swirling around GMOs. It states that “[t]he Panel needs no reminding that in many
countries both at the political level and in society at large extensive debates have been going on about the
advantages and risks of these products.” 113

The message for the Panel is this: do not allow the

complainants to put blinders on you, you know very well what this case is about. As the EC states, their
regulatory scheme represents “a very finely calibrated equilibrium between all interests involved.” 114
That balancing, it is implied, is the basic task of sovereign governments.

Returning to the central storyline, the EC submits that this issue is clearly too broad and too important to
be dealt with under a trade agreement. First, it points to the narrow focus of the SPS Agreement with
respect to the types of risks that SPS measures can be aimed to protect against: the SPS Agreement only
applies to measures aimed at mitigating risks to human, plant or animal life or health.

Where legal complexity is concerned, the Complainants prefer that the matter be treated under the
SPS Agreement, but measures in respect of GMOs and GM food are much too complex to be
covered by that WTO agreement alone. These measures seek to protect against risks, in particular
environmental risks that are not covered by the SPS Agreement. And even with respect to health
risks, the EC will demonstrate that some risks against which the EC legislation seeks to protect,
may not come under the SPS notion of “disease.” It will, therefore be necessary to arrive at a
much more sophisticated legal analysis than the Complainants have set out….in respect of each
of the GMOs the steps which have been taken to protect the environment and to conserve
biodiversity are reasonable and legitimate, are not necessarily sanitary or phytosanitary in
character, and fall in whole or in part outside the scope of the SPS Agreement…” 115
The SPS Agreement, it is argued, cannot apply to measures taken to protect against risks to the
environment. The EC submits that the agreement is specifically designed to regulate measures aimed at a
narrow subset of risks. To the extent that the risks that the EC sought to avoid are of a different nature, as
is “partially the case” with GMOs, the EC argues that “the provisions of the SPS Agreement are simply
not designed to address such risks”. 116 The issues arising out of the existence of GMOs, according to the
EC “go far beyond” the risks envisaged by the SPS Agreement. “Indeed”, says the EC, “they deserve their
own agreement, and so a specific agreement has been negotiated” for this purpose. It is the Cartagena
Protocol “which lays down the most pertinent provisions to any consideration of problems related to
GMOs”. 117
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The EC is raising risks other than those to health or the environment? The complainants had made no
mention of any such risks. But as the EC knows, the Panel is likely to be aware that citizens of many
countries have genuine “misgivings about trade imbalance and multi-national corporate (often American)
dominance, fears that the corporate quest for profit will override health considerations, the plight of small
farmers, a mistrust of science, the erosion of trust in regulatory authorities, the desire for consumer choice
and greater participation in decisions, and moral reservations about the meaning of manipulating living
things”. 118 The EC submission thus includes a defense of not only the natural or biophysical landscape
within its borders, but the social and cultural landscape as well:

First, there is a growing recognition that the authorisation of GM crops can have significant
socio-economic effects, for example on the production of organic crops. Coexistence between GM
crops and conventional crops has become a subject of increasing attention in that context, with
research focusing on the potential impacts of GM crops on non-GM crops and on the economic
and other consequences of inter-mingling…Second, beyond socio-economic considerations, some
countries also take into account religious and ethical considerations. 119
The second element of this storyline involves a questioning of the appropriateness of the WTO as forum
in which to resolve this matter. The EC states that the complainants are seeking to use the WTO as a
means of “short-circuiting” the responsible actions of the EC:
The EC considers that the approach is entirely misconceived: it is not the function of the WTO
Agreement to allow one group of countries to impose its values on another group. Nor is it the
purpose of the WTO Agreement to trump the other relevant rules of international law which
permit – or even require – a prudent and precautionary approach. 120
The EC states that there is a “serious question as to whether the WTO is the appropriate international
forum” for resolving all the issues raised. Further, the EC regrets that “the Complainants have chosen to
start a dispute settlement procedure based on flawed premises, rather than to promote international cooperation as a means to build a sound international framework for addressing the GMO issue.” 121

To conclude this section on the rhetoric of pleading, I turn to Canada’s second submission which nicely
captures the themes and attitude of the complainants’ case. It states:
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[D]espite the EC’s attempts to mischaracterize and exaggerate the risks of biotech products and to
insinuate that there exists significant and intractable scientific uncertainty, it is abundantly clear
that the EC’s scientific committees have thoroughly and carefully assessed, on a case-by-case
basis, each of these risks in the context of specific applications and on the basis of sound and
adequate scientific evidence. The unambiguous conclusion of the EC’s own scientists is that the
biotech products in question do not pose any greater risk to human health or the environment than
their conventional counterparts. 122
The claim is undeniably a legal one, but the battle is waged in a relatively new and unfamiliar language in
the context of trade law. Its key parameters are the extent of scientific uncertainty, the adequacy of the
scientific evidence, and the rigor of the risk assessment (including its dependence on the concept of
‘substantial equivalence’). In the next part, I document the development of the jurisprudence at the WTO
that has ushered in the changes that explain the centrality of this rhetoric.

PART III:

Disassembling the Double Helix

…it is as if even the word of the law could no longer be
authorized, in our society, except by a discourse of
truth. 123
The case under the microscope here highlights some important trends in the science-based disciplines of
the WTO with implications for the democratic governance of risk in a system of liberalized trade. As
Shaffer & Pollack have noted, GMOs raise fundamental normative questions about the relative roles for
science and politics in that system of governance. 124 This part begins by introducing the trends in
jurisprudence that have fuelled the entanglement of science in international trade law. Next, I attempt to
disassemble the double helix, first distinguishing the two strands of discourse, and then beginning to
uncover and explain the key linkage points that bind the discourses together. These are sites at which
communication flows, the points at which science may speak to law, and at which law may, in turn, speak
to science. On the strand of legal discourse, an initial site of linkage is the notion of risk. When law
encounters the need to assess risk, it turns to science.

When science, in receiving this message,

encounters uncertainty, another bond is established. Here, science turns back to law for instruction, and
law responds with the doctrine of precaution. Finally, I reflect on the complexity of the double helix
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structure and the complex web of bonds that, in the end, renders the task of disentanglement futile. In
privileging science, and adopting the attitude that scientific discourse is independent and distinct from
normative influences, the WTO (through the SPS Agreement), neglects the critical role of culture in the
perception and construction of risks.

Tracing the Entanglement in the Jurisprudence

International trade regimes increasingly label environmental and health measures taken by nations as
unfair barriers to the free movement of goods across borders. 125 Further, these regimes are increasingly
focused not only on whether the measures effect unjustified trade discrimination 126, but whether the
measures are “reasonable and rational”. 127 To this end, science has come to be relied on as an objective
arbiter, tasked with distinguishing whether a national environmental or health regulation is a legitimate or
illegitimate barrier to trade. These developments have led to the growing concern that the international
trade regime, particularly with respect to health and the environment, is undermining national sovereignty
and compromising democratic choices. 128

The coupling of scientific and legal discourses that I describe as the ‘double helix’ of international trade
law is a relatively recent phenomenon. Formally, the legal discourse began drawing in science with the
1994 conclusion of the SPS Agreement 129, and the affinity seems to be gaining momentum in the recent
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case law. The project of global trade liberalization is clearly energized by scientific rationality. Under the
SPS Agreement, if a nation enacts standards that are stricter than the international norm, they must base
them on risk assessment, scientific principle and scientific evidence. 130 Specifically, Article 2.2 requires
that Members ensure that every SPS measure is “based on scientific principles and is not maintained
without sufficient scientific evidence”. Article 3.3 states that Members may maintain a higher standard
than the international norm if there is a “scientific justification”. The term “scientific justification” is
explained in Article 5: measures must be “based on” a risk assessment, and the risk assessment “shall take
into account available scientific evidence” of risk (among other things).

The term “risk assessment” is defined in Annex A as:
the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the
territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which
might be applied, and of the associated potential biological and economic consequences; or the
evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the
presence of additives, contaminants, toxins, or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or
foodstuffs. 131
That a nation wishing to enact a measure stricter than the international norm must base it on risk
assessment, scientific principle and scientific evidence is true even for non-discriminatory regulations. 132
That is, even measures not drawing a distinction between the treatment of domestic products and imports
are vulnerable to attack at the trade tribunal. And while Members ostensibly have the right to enact the
SPS measures they deem appropriate to protect life or health, they must ensure that they are not more
trade restrictive than necessary. 133

WTO panels working under the SPS Agreement are charged with making “an objective assessment of the
facts”, including facts of a scientific or technical nature.134 Parties often present complex scientific
arguments in their submissions and may include scientists on their delegations, and Panels may also
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appoint independent experts to provide advice on relevant scientific and technical matters. 135 Generally,
as Jacqueline Peel explains, “a panel in an SPS dispute will appoint three to five experts covering a range
of disciplines on the advice of secretariats of international organizations such as the Codex Alimentarius
Commission”. 136 The panel is not bound to follow the advice of the experts, although in practice the
panels have tended not to stray far from the views of the experts when settling disputed scientific
questions. 137 These ‘factual’ determinations are generally not interfered with by the Appellate Body since
only matters which can be framed as legal claims may be raised on appeal.138 As a result of this regime,
tradeoffs reached in domestic risk regulatory processes are increasingly likely to be subject to
international scrutiny, and governments forced to defend their regulatory regimes under the SPS
Agreement are finding that “deference to the judgment of regulators balancing social against scientific
considerations has not been a feature of the SPS case law to date”.139 The regime essentially sets up a
binary choice: a measure is either based in “sound science” or it represents “disguised protectionism”.

It is safe to assume that these developments in the jurisprudence have shaped the form of claims-making
by actors seeking to achieve success under this regime. In particular, in this case, I would argue that the
developments have invited the parties to purposefully include scientific claims in their submissions to the
panel. At the same time, we can expect the parties to carefully weave legal and normative claims into the
scientific discourse. 140 Thus my analysis seeks to un-spiral the two strands of discourse in the double
helix with the aim of exposing the key binding sites where linkages between the strands are anchored.
The first step in disassembling the helical structure, and in understanding the discursive battle unfolding
over GMOs, would seem to entail distinguishing between ‘the scientific’ and ‘the legal’.
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Distinguishing the Strands

Legal discourse, as described by Peter Goodrich, is a language of power with specific political and
ideological motives. 141 It is, according to Stanley Fish, irreducibly rhetorical. 142 Legal discourse is
marked by its highly textual character and also by the restrictive institutionalization of its authorship and
the specialized character of the legal audience. 143 According to Goodrich, it is “wholly imbricated within
the interrelationships of power and truth or knowledge…it is paradigmatically concerned with truth, both
in terms of evidence and verification…”.144 Legal discourse imports a “socially institutionalized set of
restrictions or limitations upon who may speak, how much may be said and upon what topic and in what
contexts”. 145 It is an authoritative, unitary language. As illustrated by the previous analysis, it is a
“dialogic form which endevours to predetermine the conditions and contexts of its reception”. 146
Conventionally, legal discourse has sought to “exclude from the ambit of legal authority the possibility of
alternative meanings and other discourses”. 147 And here lies the significance of the recent trends in the
SPS jurisprudence: the legal discourse explicitly invites science into its realm.

Science is understood in this work as a particularly powerful discursive and institutional framework. At
its core is a strategy, or group of strategies, for knowledge-seeking. Thus science is a highly structured
process of inquiry; a set of methods for knowing the world. It is at once a “form of organized work, a site
of politics, a marketplace of ideas, an exercise in meaning-making, and an instrument of power". 148 The
conventional view of science, however, holds it out as a neutral and objective method for evaluating
empirical knowledge, for creating “globally convergent understandings about environmental
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problems”. 149 On this view, it appears almost natural that an institution like the WTO, in its SPS
Agreement, would turn to science for assistance.

But science’s ability to churn out globally convergent understandings of problems, particularly risk and
trade problems, is under heavy fire. Science is more likely to be seen as both contingent and
fundamentally indeterminate. As Joanne Scott notes, there is a large, theoretically sophisticated body of
literature exploring the role of science in law and policy. “One of the central premises of much of this
literature”, she states, “has been a rejection of positivistic conceptions of science as capable of revealing
an objective truth; a version of reality untainted by politics, ideology or exogenous values”. 150 As a result
of advances in this literature, mostly pursued in the tradition of the sociology of scientific knowledge, the
socially-constructed nature of scientific knowledge is now widely accepted.

Thus it no longer is tenable to proclaim that ‘scientific facts’, themselves, drive policy responses or
regulatory outcomes. In order to understand the dynamic by which science influences policy we have to
probe further. How do certain facts become salient? How do certain actors acquire credibility? Whose
knowledge is deemed important, and how is uncertainty resolved? Who participates? Instead of assuming
that scientific evidence gains authority and confers credibility simply through its correspondence with
‘truth’, this literature would encourage more situated, localized investigations, asking in particular cases
how scientific claims are interpreted within particular institutional frameworks.

As David Mercer and others have illustrated, “[t]he rhetorical mechanics of establishing a claim as
scientific can take a myriad of forms”. 151 Making the ‘facts of the matter’ do rhetorical work sometimes
involves constructing broad framing arguments from basic declaratory statements. 152

For example,

beginning with a section titled, “How the Technology Works”, the U.S. submission sets out to teach the
Panel the scientific ‘truth’ about ‘modern biotechnology’:
During the past century, scientists also discovered that the basic genetic material in all living
organisms is chemically similar. All DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid, the molecule that genes are
made of) is a combination of just four chemical compounds – adenine, thymine, cystosine and
guanine. The sequence in which these compounds appear on a particular gene is a biological code
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– instructions that the cell machinery follows in order to manufacture different proteins. The
particular set of proteins produced in an organism – whether a plant, animal or microorganism –
direct the functions necessary for life and for the expression of specific traits. Because DNA is
chemically similar in all living things, different organisms can read and interpret the information
encoded on any gene. 153
This passage concludes with a broad framing argument, essentially a judgment, by building up a series of
basic declaratory statements. Essentially, it derives the conclusion that ‘transgenics’, or the insertion of
genes from an organism of one species into another organism of another, even if very different, species is
acceptable, even natural, because all living things are essentially the same. The U.S. neatly packs a
normative judgment about crossing the species barrier into a descriptive passage about basic molecular
biology. Through this maneuver, genetic ‘facts’ can be made to speak about trade.

Another strategy for establishing a claim as scientific is to invoke the complex methods through which
scientific knowledge is produced and ratified to build authority and credibility. 154 Just as discourses can
be seen to be “producing objects”, such as ‘rDNA crops’ or ‘Frankenfoods’, they can also be seen to be
“producing subjects”. 155 This discourse constitutes ‘the scientist’ as a particular person. It produces a
subject with particular authority, knowledge, and skills. 156 This work combines with the “sound science”
orientation to portray all opposition to biotechnology as lacking in authority. It is not satisfied with
establishing the falsity of the non-scientists’ opinion; it is concerned further “with the negation of the
reality of the non-scientist as a source of any valid opinion on biotechnology”. 157 It simply denies the
opposition a voice.

For example, to demonstrate how certain actors are systematically associated with specific types of
actions and rationalities, I return to the parties’ submissions with an eye to discovering “particular
vocabularies and markers” placed specifically to increase the status of some actors or to undermine the
legitimacy of others. 158 In the complainants’ submissions, scientists take the following actions: they
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“obtain greater understanding”, “learn”, “identify mechanisms” 159, “discover” 160, “operate, “develop”,
“improve” and “accomplish”.161
unambiguous”

162

Scientific opinions “do not equivocate”, they make “clear and

findings. The methods employed by scientists guarantees the objectivity of their claims.

On the other hand, the EC actions are couched in emotional terms: they are arbitrary and
“inconsistent” 163. They “admit”, “attempt” 164 and “claim”. 165 They “obfuscate and mischaracterize” facts
and evidence, present arguments that “find little, if any, resonance” in logic 166; they “insinuate” 167,
“rationalize” 168, selectively use scientific studies to “distort and exaggerate risks”, and they “blatantly
distort” the text of the Agreement and its interpretation in the jurisprudence. David Delaney has recently
asserted that “we know law most intimately by what it renounces, repudiates, ignores or denies”.169 To
know the SPS Agreement, then, is to know the following: it renounces inconsistency, repudiates
irrationality, ignores “lay person”, consumer and public views, and thus, as will be argued in the
following section, it denies the cultural dimensions of risk perception and risk construction.

Identifying the Binding Sites: Risk, Uncertainty and Precaution

Having attempted to distinguish the strands of scientific and legal discourses that combine to form the
double helix of international trade law dealing with environmental and health risks, I turn to their
disentanglement. A key task in this regard is to uncover and identify the key linkage points that bind the
discourses together. Each strand is punctuated intermittently by nodes of communication where linkages
are anchored. The conversation, on the surface, seems relatively straight-forward. Legal discourse, for
example, turns initially to science with the notion of risk. Scientific discourse then turns back to law for
guidance when it encounters uncertainty. And finally, law responds with the doctrine of precaution. As I
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will argue however, communication flows not only through the official channels, but also takes place
interstitially. In this way, the strand of scientific discourse is permeated constantly by normative, social,
ethical and cultural influences.

The Risk Bond

As discussed, the legal regime established by the SPS Agreement explicitly imports a requirement that
Members “justify” regulatory measures more strict than the international norm. To be justified, measures
must be “based on” a risk assessment, and the risk assessment “shall take into account available scientific
evidence” of risk. Thus an initial site of linkage between law and science is the notion of risk. The SPS
definition of “risk assessment” indicates that it should include both an evaluation of the likelihood or
probability that harm will ensure, and an evaluation of the magnitude or consequences of the harm
materializing. 170 This approach, which treats risk as “a quantity that can be measured precisely by means
of a formula” 171, fits comfortably in the rationalist tradition and explains why “risk” has become the
“dominant way to talk about GMOs in national and international circles”. 172

The U.S. submission adopts the ‘conventional’ view of “risk assessment”: it is understood as “a factually
grounded, objective, and value-free, analytic exercise requiring (1) precise identification of possible
harms to human health and the environment, and (2) use of formal, expert-based assessments of the
likelihood of such harms. Public values and concerns are thought to be relevant and appropriate only in
the phase of risk management, which is perceived to follow risk assessment and be separate from it”. 173
As is pointed out by the academic amicus brief, this conventional and “outmoded” view of risk
assessment has been “systematically discredited through social science research over the past decade”. 174
The amicae point out that the reliability of particular risk assessments is closely tied to the “degree of
maturity and/or comprehensiveness of the scientific knowledge base”, the contingencies of “national
contexts” (both scientific and cultural), and the “wider background assumptions and value commitments”
of those generating scientific knowledge for policy applications. 175
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The language of risk is the language of probabilities. 176 “[R]ecognizing the impossibility of certainty
about the future, [risk assessment] simultaneously makes this lack of certainty quantifiable in terms of
probability”. 177 The very concept of risk is an admission of imperfect knowledge, of significant and
persistent ‘unknowns’.

Thus the call for risk assessment itself, is a call for an investigation of

uncertainties.

The Uncertainty Bond

How should these uncertainties be resolved? Brian Wynne’s important 1992 work which breaks down
the concept of uncertainty into several distinct components is critical. He emphasizes the key distinction
between conventional conceptions of uncertainty and the concept of “indeterminacy”. 178 Uncertainty is
conventionally described as a lack of data. It arises when a situation has never been monitored, or the
effect has been judged too expensive to measure. The perception that this type of uncertainty is dominant
has fuelled the conventional view of risk as “amenable to resolution by the production of ‘more science’
to fill the gaps”. 179

Conventional risk assessment methods, similarly, tend to “treat all uncertainties as if they were due to the
incomplete definition of an essentially determinate cause-effect system”. 180 It is now clear, in large part
due to the work of Wynne and others working in the sociology of scientific knowledge, that more
distressing forms of uncertainty prevail.

Indeterminacy, for example, involves “recognition of the

essentially open-ended and conditional nature of all knowledge and its embeddedness in social
contexts”. 181

If scientific uncertainty is not merely incomplete data, but is more pervasive, then

answering policy questions through risk assessment becomes more problematic. The “inevitable gap
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between the closed conditions of experimental research, and the open-ended and contingent
circumstances in which the results of scientific research are applied” severely limits our predictive
capacities. 182

The prevailing approach in the trade tribunals, which draws a sharp boundary between risk assessment
processes and risk management, relies heavily on the “ideal” relationship between science and politics. In
this view, knowledge is generated by competent, objective scientists in accordance with strict professional
standards. The knowledge is then channelled, undistorted, to policy-makers who employ it as the factual
basis for their decision. 183 Robert Howse, for example, questions the wisdom of bringing “non-scientific
considerations” into risk assessment. In so doing, he argues, “one would be tilting a priori the scientific
risk assessment towards the desired regulatory outcome, and any objective, unbiased informational output
into the democratic deliberative process would be eliminated”. 184 The “ideal” relationship between
science and politics, and the view expressed by Howse, however, has been disintegrating for many years
under relentless critiques emanating from research in the sociology of scientific knowledge. 185 This
research reveals that even the scientific component of expert findings is necessarily influenced by the
values, worldview and cultural filters of the risk assessor. It directly draws into question the objectivity
of risk assessment, and the legitimacy of demarcating a boundary between that process and the ‘more
political’ risk management process. As Joanne Scott argues:

in the event that science neither proves the existence of a risk, nor proves that there is no risk,
there is scope for ‘rational’ debate as to whether this theoretical risk should be tolerated. But it is
a debate that will inevitably transcend scientific rationality, thus shattering the fragile illusion of
objectivity and universal commensurability… 186
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With respect to the GMO dispute, the academic amicae argue that the “biological properties and
environmental and social impacts” for products of biotechnology are “neither well defined or certain”;
that “differences in public values” are relevant not only to the management of risks, but also to their
definition and assessment; that the scientific basis for risk assessment is “fluid and changing” both within
national contexts and with respect to the development of international standards; and finally, that
biotechnological risk depends on the behavior of producers and consumers embedded in particular social
and environmental contexts. 187 Essentially, what the amicae are arguing is that scientific uncertainty
consists of not only inadequate and incomplete data, which is expressed in confidence intervals and can
usually be reduced through further investigation, but includes pervasive indeterminacies arising from the
“confluence of biological, ecological, socio-cultural, and political systems”. 188 When science encounters
this intractable uncertainty, it inevitably turns back to law for instruction. Law responds with the doctrine
of precaution.

The Precaution Bond

The precautionary principle has been called the “defining principle” of the modern environmental
movement. 189 Environmental and health advocates having been pushing for several years to have the
precautionary principle recognized formally as a principle of customary international law. 190 Current
incarnations of the principle often take their form from the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development.

191

It states that “[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full

scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
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environmental degradation”. 192 Essentially, the precautionary principle mandates action in the face of
scientific uncertainty to prevent potential, but uncertain, harm to human health or the environment.

Conceptions of the precautionary principle range from the very inchoate notion of ‘precaution’, which
takes on more the form of a philosophy than a legal principle, to the formal textual expressions of the
principle in international law. This more flexible notion of ‘precaution’, popularized in the activist strain
of the environmental health literature, has led to demands for the further incorporation of precautionary
reasoning in the resolution of risk controversies.

The WTO specifically identifies the precautionary principle in Art.5.7 of the SPS Agreement. It states
that where “scientific evidence is insufficient”, governments may act “provisionally” on the basis of
“available pertinent information”. 193 But despite this explicit recognition of the precautionary principle,
the EC (with the support of several non-governmental organizations) challenged this regime in the Beef
Hormones that came before the WTO in 1998. In that case, the EC sought to incorporate precautionary
reasoning in a more comprehensive way. Relying on the assertion that the precautionary principle
constitutes a principle of customary international law, the EC argued that the principle’s influence should
be extended beyond Art.5.7 and should inform the tribunal’s interpretation of all provisions in the SPS
Agreement. According to the EC, the precautionary principle should have been available in order to
justify national regulations that accounted for consumer concerns and risk perceptions of the wider public,
even when those perceptions were not supported by the bulk of scientific evidence. The WTO tribunals,
however, refused to apply the principle beyond the scope of the provisional measures enabled by Art. 5.7
of the SPS Agreement. 194

Since this comprehensive application of the precautionary principle was rejected by the WTO Appellate
Body in Beef Hormones, the EC has actively sought to export its ‘precautionary approach’ to regulation to
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international regimes in an effort to prevent future trade challenges. 195 The EC can now cite to the
Cartagena Protocol as evidence of international consensus on the application of the precautionary
principle. 196 The Protocol entered into force on September 11, 2003 and is signed by over 100 countries.
Most countries that export GMOs, however, have not ratified the Protocol, including the complainants in
this case. 197

The Protocol expressly incorporates the precautionary principle. It states that a country may reject the
importation of a GMO (or “living modified organism”, in the language of the Protocol) for release into
the environment where there is a “[l]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific
information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects…on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human
health…”. 198

Canada’s position on this point is typical of the complainants’ stance. Canada argues that there is no
inconsistency between the obligations of the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO obligations relevant to
this dispute. The Protocol, in this view, is premised on transparent, scientifically sound risk assessment as
the basis for decisions regarding the importation of the products to which it applies. While allowing that
the Protocol may reflect the “precautionary approach”, Canada notes that the precautionary principle
“finds reflection” in several provisions of the SPS Agreement, including Article 5.7. Canada also reminds
the Panel that the Appellate Body in Beef Hormones held that the precautionary principle could not be
invoked as a ground for justifying SPS measures that were otherwise inconsistent with the obligations of
Members set out in particular provisions of the SPS Agreement.

In fact, as mentioned in Part II, the narrative of prudence and precaution has all but replaced any
reference to the precautionary principle in the submissions of the EC in the GMO dispute.

The

“precautionary principle”, itself, is no longer being invoked primarily as a legal instrument. The EC
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remembers well the outcome in Beef Hormones. Instead of making reference to the “precautionary
principle”, the language employed is that of precaution and prudence. It is the rhetorical deployment of
the precautionary principle without the reliance on it in a strict legal sense.

Any legal relevance of the precautionary principle to the resolution of the dispute is now mediated
through the EC’s reliance on the Cartagena Protocol:
…between 1996 and 2000 a specialised international convention – the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety (“Biosafety Protocol”) - was negotiated, which is premised on a clear understanding
that the inherent characteristics of GMOs require them to be subject to rigorous scrutiny so as to
ensure that they do not cause harm to the environment or human health, or cause socio-economic
disruptions. 199

Thus, the EC takes the very existence of the Cartagena Protocol to be evidence that the international
community has concluded that GMOs are not to be treated as being the same as their non-GMO,
conventional equivalents. Further, it is, according to the EC, the Protocol that stands for the proposition
that special measures of protection, based on the precautionary principle, are justified with respect to the
regulation of GMOs. 200

The EC scheme for the regulation of GMOs can be considered precautionary not only in the sense that it
requires prior approval of GMOs rather than simply assuming their safety until proven otherwise 201, but
also because it rejects the assumption of ‘substantial equivalence’. The scheme thus requires prior
approval of GMOs, based on the demonstration of their ‘safety’ (taking into account the uncertainties that
derive from their inherent differences from conventional foods), rather than assuming their ‘substantial
equivalence’ to conventional foods until proven otherwise. But the scheme is still not precautionary in
the Art.5.7 sense; that is, it is not explicitly provisional.

Thus, the precise form of law’s ‘answer’ to science with respect to the binding site labeled precaution is
still relatively opaque. Where it is relatively well-accepted in international environmental law that when
faced with the question of how to handle scientific uncertainties, law’s response is to now routinely
answer with the precautionary principle, in the context of world trade law that answer is considerably
more tentative. What the WTO tribunals will decide in this particular case is the appropriate role for
precaution in the science-based trade disciplines – that finding is hotly contested and eagerly anticipated.
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The axis of disagreement seems to be the question: What has really changed since Beef Hormones? Has
the precautionary principle, in the intervening years, undeniably acquired the status of customary
international law such that it should inform the interpretation of the WTO agreements generally? Has the
coming into force of the Cartagena Protocol fundamentally altered the state of international law with
respect to the trade in GMOs? And finally, if the trade tribunals do decide that measures governing trade
in GMOs are now sheltered, to a certain extent, from trade scrutiny by the precautionary principle, will
they limit precaution’s influence on the science-based trade disciplines to cases involving GMOs, or will
law’s answer of ‘precaution’ be construed more broadly?

The exchange I have outlined, between the parallel strands of legal and scientific discourse in the ‘double
helix’ of international trade law, on the surface, seems relatively straight-forward. Legal discourse, for
example, turns initially to science with the notion of risk. Scientific discourse then turns back to law for
guidance when it encounters uncertainty. And finally, law responds, albeit somewhat tentatively, with the
doctrine of precaution. As I will argue however, communication flows not only through these official
channels, but also takes place interstitially.

Science and law are in a complex relationship: both

discourses are constantly constituted through ubiquitous interaction with the normative, the social, the
ethical, and the cultural.

Disentangling the Strands: The Problem of Interstitial Communication

While identifying the strands of discourse is, in theory, a simple task, teasing them apart proves much
more difficult. The parties face an incentive, now that the privileging of scientific discourse is entrenched
by the SPS Agreement, to embed normative and legal arguments within what are ostensibly ‘scientific’
claims. But the structure of the SPS Agreement assumes that science can be injected, in an objective
manner, into to the legal process -- that the strand labeled science can be essentially isolated and extracted
from other influences.

This view tends to underestimate the degree of interstitial communication,

enormous number and sheer complexity of exchanges and points of contact.

But the discourse of liberalized trade prefers to obscure the extent to which the scientific discourse is
fundamentally intertwined with the legal, the social, the political and the cultural. Instead, it prefers to
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deny the inevitable blurring of technical and normative dimensions.202 The scientific strand is not and
cannot be purely technical; nor can the legal be purely normative. It is futile to attempt to maintain the
separation of the discourses. The two strands are hopelessly wound up together and the number of points
of contact, of interstitial exchange, are innumerable.
Thus, in privileging science, and adopting the attitude that scientific discourse is independent and distinct
from normative influences, the WTO (through the SPS Agreement), neglects the critical role of culture in
the perception and construction of risks.

It is clear that the concepts of risk, uncertainty and precaution have now become integral to the
nomenclature of the science-based trade disciplines. The difficulty underlying the application of each of
these concepts is this pesky reality: risks are perceived and constructed through cultural filters.203
Differences in social, political and cultural contexts matter.

They matter in the perception and

construction of what is “risky”, in the perception and construction of what is “uncertain”, and therefore,
they matter to the determination of whether “precaution” in particular situations, is required.
In reflecting on the capacity of the science-based trade disciplines to accommodate culture, many will
point to the SPS Agreement’s Art.5.4 which is said to guarantee Members the “right” to set their own
level of protection from risks. Art.5.4 empowers Members to choose the level of protection that the
Member deems to be “appropriate to protect human life or health within its territory”. 204 In determining
their level of protection, Article 5.4 also states, however, that Members should “take into account the
objective of minimizing trade effects”. 205 Further, Art.5.5 stipulates that each Member “shall avoid
arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if
such distinctions result in discrimination or disguised restrictions on international trade”.206

This limit on the Members’ ability to choose its own level of protection imposes significant restrictions
on the capacity for Art.5.4 to accommodate culture within the SPS Agreement. The requirement for
“internal consistency” is clearly aimed at rooting out disguised protectionism, but it does so with dire
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consequences.

The ‘consistency’ of a nation’s regulatory regime with respect to policies around

environmental and health risks cannot be judged by reference to scientific studies and probability
calculations taken out of social context.

For example, a relevant consideration in determining

‘consistency’, according to the SPS Agreement, is “the exceptional character of human health risks to
which people voluntarily expose themselves”. 207 This raises a controversial issue in risk regulation: is it
‘rational’ for citizens to place a higher value on avoiding the same percentage chance of one risk as
opposed to another?

Cass Sunstein & Richard Pildes emphasize the relevance of context to the determination of “rationality”
in risk assessment. 208 When comparing expert and lay judgments, for example, they have argued that
competing understandings of rationality are at play, each embedded within a specific set of assumptions
about how risks ought to be valued. 209 Laypersons will tend to treat voluntarily-incurred risks differently
than involuntarily-incurred risks; they will treat catastrophic or irreversible risks as distinct as well. But as
Sunstein and Pildes argue, it is quite possible to defend, with reasons, why these categories of risks
should be regulated in a different way. “Purely scientific considerations”, in their view, “will not permit
us to say which is the right way to resolve what rational policy choice ought to mean in the regulatory
setting”. 210

A trade objective that seeks to impose “consistency” in a national regulatory regime imports a set of
unchallenged but contentious assumptions about the relative ‘rationalities’ of expert and citizen
assessments of risk. Much work has been devoted to the question of why citizen perceptions of a risk
may differ from ‘expert assessments’ of the same risk. 211 At bottom, the answer seems to be that public
perception of risk tends to include elements that are excluded from expert assessments. 212 As Sunstein
and Pildes note:
There is one strikingly consistent finding in risk studies: Laypeople assess risk through different
value frameworks from those implicitly embedded in expert approaches. Laypeople do not look
207
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only or even primarily to expected annual mortality; they look as well at a number of factors
determining the acceptability of different risks in different contexts. 213

Specifically, study after study has found that citizens often take account of the ‘catastrophic’ nature of the
risk; the ‘controllability’ of the risk; the permanence of the potential loss; the equitable distribution of the
danger and benefits associated with the risk; and the characteristics of the likely victims. 214 There is little
basis, then, for the claim that the expert view is inherently more rational than the public assessment of the
risk. 215

Citizens’ perceptions and constructions of risks include assessments of the technology’s social, political
and cultural implications. They include judgments about the fairness of the technology in terms of the
distribution of risks and benefits and in terms of the values seen to be at stake. As Douglas & Wildavsky
have argued, “between private, subjective risk perception and public, physical science there lies culture, a
middle area of shared beliefs and values”. 216 In risk-taking and in risk-aversion, they continue, these
shared values, beliefs and fears must be part of the dialogue. In fact, Douglas and Wildavsky would assert
that societies “choose their nightmares” on the basis of both social and cultural criteria, and because of
this, their nightmares are different. 217

Conclusion:

Nature/Culture Clash?

…the work we do with concepts transforms them. 218

This dispute is captivating legal audiences in part because he EC and the U.S. are the world’s two
principal protagonists of liberalized trade. 219
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foundations for a system of free trade would be present, and yet increasingly, the EC and the U.S.
disagree completely and sensationally on issues of huge national and international importance. The
particular technologies at issue in this case, because they force the reconsideration of the basic categories
of nature and culture, shatter some of the most elemental conceptions of human identity. 220 They “go to
the human capacity not merely to control and regulate the environment, but also to make it and own it”. 221

There is no question that this case is playing out in the shadow of Beef Hormones, the food fight that
preceded it. When the WTO ultimately ruled against the EC ban on synthetic hormones in beef in 1998,
and the EC refused to comply with the ruling, the WTO authorized Canada and the U.S. to retaliate by
withdrawing trade concessions. Both countries continue to target traditional foods such as the French foie
gras, Roquefort cheese and Dijon mustard with retaliatory tariffs. 222
This experience shaped popular understandings of GMOs in Europe, according to Shaffer & Pollack, as
GMOs “became associated with consumer anxieties related to food safety crises, distrust of regulators and
scientific assessments, disquiet over corporate control of agricultural production, ethical unease over
genetic modification techniques, environmental concerns, and anger over the use by the United States of
international trade rules to attempt to force “unnatural” foods to Europeans”. 223

As is reflected in the submissions, the construction of the natural/unnatural boundary is central to
winning the rhetorical battle over GMOs.

The dominant discourse on biotechnology reflects an

“advanced capitalization of nature” that seeks to manipulate and modify biological organisms in search of
new information, products and markets. 224 In fact, “nature” is not always invoked in an effort to
denounce human intervention. As David Delaney argues, “nature” can also be “a category whose specific
function is to render physicality knowable and, often, in need of being controlled. It is a category which
informs the social-material practices by which people intervene in physical processes and participate in
transformations in the material world”. 225 Further, according to Murray Bookchin, the “all-encompassing
image of an intractable nature that must be tamed by a rational humanity” provides an easy rationale for
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the “domineering forms of reason, science and technology” that are exemplified by the very idea of the
genetic modification of foods. 226 “Nature”, according to these arguments, “is an ideologically saturated
notion that is inscribed on aspects of reality to render them meaningful in particular, partial and not
disinterested ways”. 227 But as Delaney emphasizes, it is important to ask not what nature is, but what
nature does. 228 And as was illustrated by this project in deconstruction, the result of labeling an object as
“natural” can be both a moral injunction against technological intervention as well as an invitation “to
render what is so inscribed suitable for domination.” 229

Nature is a trope for differentiation.

230

It places objects, processes in opposition to human or cultural

artifacts. Law and science, in this paper, are viewed as key cultural domains from within which
“meaning is mapped to the world” and to “nature”. As Sheila Jasanoff has explained, we are “continually
reinscribing the boundary between the social and the natural, the world created by us and the world we
imagine to exist beyond our control”. 231 “Nature” is a cultural category. Donna Haraway for example,
has argued that the distinction between the social and the natural has become increasingly porous. 232
Opposition to GMOs can be understood as a site of resistance to this trend. GMOs embody what “many
actors see as the commodification and technologization of nature, and as the loss of local autonomy over
“natural” and cultivated environments in the face of global capital and genetic rationality”. 233 They
represent an opportunity for actors to draw a bright line.

Sheila Jasanoff & Marybeth Long Martello characterize the decade of the 1990s as “a long march toward
doubt and uncertainty”. 234 The power of science to quell controversy declined precipitously, and its
knack for bridging “deep ideological and normative divisions” basically dropped off completely. They
argue that the most pressing challenge facing global governance is the accommodation of difference. As
globalization works to erase distance, in their view, governance structures must not only devise
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mechanisms that transcend localism, they must do so in a way that confers respect on ‘the local’. 235 They
urge us to abandon the idea of globalization as an inevitable homogenizing force.

Industrial societies, despite their many commonalities, articulate their needs and desires in
different voices. Despite the ubiquity of CNN, Microsoft, and the Coca-Cola can – and the global
homogeneity they signal – the din of multivocality rises rapidly as one leaves the havens of the
Industrial West. Politicians and citizens in Washington, Paris, Tokyo, and Baghdad have met the
challenges and dislocations of the present with disparate resources and divergent criteria of what
makes life worth living. The world is not a single place, and even ‘the West’ accommodates
technological innovations such as computers and genetically modified foods with divided
expectations and multiple rationalities. Cultural specificity survives with astonishing resilience in
the face of the leveling forces of modernity. 236
Cross-cultural scientific exchanges or conflicts, such as the case under the microscope here, often reveal
that scientific knowledge of nature is produced through, and reflects, highly particular and locally specific
ways of knowing. Differences in regulatory approach can derive from differences in lived experiences (in
the U.K. many have raised the legacy of the BSE tragedy as a primary factor in the public’s opposition to
GM foods 237), from distinct histories, from cultural or intellectual traditions (others have pointed to the
cultural symbolism of the British countryside as a haven for birds and wildlife). 238 Invoking a ‘neutral’
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science to arbitrate such disputes, as the WTO regime attempts to do, is unlikely to quell controversy. In
fact, Jasanoff and others have argued that the idea that a strict reliance on science will overcome “deepseated and consequential divergences” within the global order, a fundamental basis of the SPS Agreement,
is merely an illusion.

While trade disputes do not generally raise the temperature of the general public, disputes about food
seem to inspire charged emotions. In some minds at least, and in some countries more than others, food
is in a completely different category from other traded products. 239 “It is part of national and regional
identity”. 240 As David Byrne, the EC Health and Consumer Safety Commissioner has remarked, “for
some member states” food quality is “nearly synonymous with sovereignty”. 241 Thus it is not surprising
that “the imposition of novel foods that challenge closely held cultural values is likely to be resisted”. 242
Public reactions to risk are “deeply embedded in social structures and are powerfully shaped by notions of
equity and legitimacy with respect to the institutions that are in place to ensure safety and reliability”. 243
Further, while the ‘voluntariness’ of a risk has been demonstrated time and again to be an important
determinant of the public’s acceptance of risks, the notion of the WTO involuntarily imposing food on
Europeans is a particularly powerful image. For example, when the U.K. government announced its plan
to finally approve a controversial GM maize developed by Bayer, the Daily Mail (London) proclaimed
“So we’re going to be force-fed GM”. 244

As this analysis has demonstrated, the SPS Agreement continues to “invoke, and so to reinforce, the
boundary between science and other forms of knowledge”. 245 It is based on the misconception that the
strand of discourse labeled science can be isolated from contextual influences, extracted and imported
value-free into WTO disputes. It perpetuates the myth that the double helix can be disentwined, the
239
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scientific disentangled from the legal, the technical peeled away from the normative. Most importantly,
the SPS Agreement ignores the role of culture in the perception and construction of risks.

The SPS Agreement rests on the shaky foundation of the assumption that the expert, technocratic,
scientific view risk is inherently more ‘rational’ than public assessments of risk. More and more,
according to Sheila Jasanoff, the notion that citizens are too simple or unsophisticated to understand and
assess risks is being rejected. Lay judgments that are more risk-averse than those of experts are coming
to be recognized as "reflecting different framings of technology’s social implications, different
perceptions of the feasibility of control, different appraisals of the values at stake, and different judgments
about fairness in the distribution of risks and benefits". 246 Further, even trade law scholars are beginning
to agree that if citizens place values on risks that depend on contextual features, and if these valuations
are reasonable, then democratic principles would require that government action recognizes the relevant
contextual differences, even where it may make the regulatory regime seem “inconsistent” to outsiders.247

I attempt in this work to expose some implications of the privileging of science by subjecting the
submissions in the GMO dispute to a discourse analysis. Further, by critically articulating the points of
connection between the two strands of discourse that constitute the “double helix” of international trade
law, I aim to deepen perspective with respect to the concepts of risk and precaution that are gaining
currency in contemporary governance debates. It has been my aim to offer a fresh way of looking at this
problem that provides insight not by simplifying the issue into one suitable for doctrinal legal analysis,
but by adding layers of complexity and exposing the “tangled politics” of an issue that squarely raises
theoretical questions about the “co-constitution of nature and culture”. 248 Law is seen a site of official
contestation between rival framings. The Panel faces an adversarial contest in which the parties’ seek
official validation of both their construction of nature (and what may or may not find refuge within its
bounds), and their view of the role for culture within the institution of global trade. A decision from the
WTO Panel is now expected early in 2006.
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